Canadian Military History
Volume 18

Issue 4

Article 5

2009

“A Unique Art” Canadian Anti-Gas Respirator Production in the
Second World War
Andrew Iarocci

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh
Part of the Military History Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew Iarocci "“A Unique Art” Canadian Anti-Gas Respirator Production in the Second World War."
Canadian Military History 18, 4 (2009)

This Canadian War Museum is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier.
For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

: “A Unique Art” Canadian Anti-Gas Respirator Production in the Second World War

“A Unique Art”

Canadian Anti-Gas Respirator Production
in the Second World War
Andrew Iarocci

T

he anti-gas respirator (gas mask)
is a ubiquitous artifact of 20th
century total war. Introduced in 1915,
respirators dramatically transformed
the appearance of soldiers, replacing
the last trace of a man’s unique identity
with a ghoulish facade that quickly
became a perennial favourite of war
artists and illustrators. Throughout
the 90 years since the First World War,
anti-gas equipment has remained a
vital part of every soldier’s kit just as
Abstract: Total war in the 20th century
witnessed an ever increasing complexity
in soldiers’ weapons and equipment.
Although the state was responsible
for procuring war material, the design
and development process was often a
joint venture between government and
private industry. This article considers
that relationship in the materialcultural context of Canadian anti-gas
respirator manufacture prior to and
during the Second World War. Because
domestic industries had no experience
with military-grade respirators, it was
necessary to spend heavily on product
development. The government not
only avoided sharing this cost with
manufacturers, but also refused any
definite contracts, thanks to Depressionera budget constraints. Only when
the threat of war grew more certain
in the late 1930s did eleventh-hour
public expenditure stimulate the full
development of manufacturing capacity.
By 1940-41, domestic industry was
able to manufacture enough anti-gas
equipment for the Canadian forces, as
well as supply various components to
allied forces.

it has persisted as a versatile prop in
popular culture. Surplus respirators
can found everywhere from the Star
Wars trilogy (as alien costume props)
to Earth Day marches (as symbols of
protest against air pollution).
This article considers the Canadian
development and manufacture of
Mark IV anti-gas respirators prior to
and during the Second World War,
tracing the genesis of an artifact from
the drawing board to the soldier’s
kit. The Mark IV pattern, originally
developed in Britain in the 1920s, was
the standard respirator in Empire and
Commonwealth service throughout
much of the Second World War.
Beginning in the early 1930s,
Canadian army officers realized the
urgent requirement for modern antigas equipment, but they did not wish
to depend upon Britain for future
supplies. As such, the Canadian
army joined forces with domestic
industry to develop a homegrown
manufacturing capability where
none had existed before. Ultimately,
the Mark IV development history
sheds light not only on an important
chemical warfare artifact, but also
more generally on the manufacturing
infrastructure that was developed in
Canada at the eleventh hour to meet
the massive output requirements of
the Second World War. In this respect,
the respirator case study shares much
in common with more complex
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objects, such as the Canadian Military
Pattern trucks that were built en
masse at Windsor and Oshawa
according to British War Office
specifications. The respirators, like
Résumé : Au vingtième siècle, la guerre
totale fut marquée par la complexification
grandissante de l’équipement et des
armes des combattants. En dépit de
la responsabilité gouvernementale
de fournir ce matériel de guerre, le
processus de sa création et de son
développement a souvent été le fruit
d’une association du gouvernement
et de l’industrie privée. Le présent
article analyse cette relation dans
le contexte de la culture matérielle
liée à la production canadienne de
masques à gaz, avant et pendant la
Seconde Guerre mondiale. Comme les
entreprises du pays n’avaient aucune
expérience dans la fabrication de ce
type d’appareil respiratoire utilisé
comme arme, son développement a
nécessité d’importants investissements.
Or, le gouvernement a non seulement
évité d’en partager les coûts avec les
manufacturiers, mais il a aussi refusé
tout contrat précis s’y rattachant,
prétextant les contraintes budgétaires
de l’époque de la Dépression. Il fallut
attendre que la menace d’une guerre
certaine s’accentue, à la fin des années
1930, pour que des fonds publics
soient dégagés à la dernière minute
et assurent la pleine capacité de
production de l’industrie. Dès 1940
et 1941, les manufactures du pays
furent donc en mesure de fabriquer
assez d’équipement contre les gaz pour
les Forces canadiennes et d’autres
composantes pour leurs alliés.
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Anti-Gas Respirators in
British Empire Service, 1915-43

T

he Great War witnessed a steady
evolution in anti-gas equipment,
beginning with the Second Battle of
Ypres in April 1915. The earliest form
of protection issued to hard pressed
British and Canadian troops at that
time was a simple wade of cotton,
held between the teeth, beneath a
cloth mask impregnated with an
anti-gas solution and tied over the
nose and mouth. As soon as the
chlorine attack became a matter of
public knowledge, the War Office
issued a general appeal for large
quantities of these primitive masks,
with instructions that they be sent in
batches of 100 or more to the Chief
Ordnance Officer at the Royal Army
Clothing Department. 1 It was not
long, however, before mask designs
reached a level of sophistication that
exceeded the sewing capabilities of
various patriotic associations and
other local groups.
By May 1915, most soldiers in the
1st Canadian Division had received
the simple cotton respirators. At the
same time, these were supplemented
with the smoke helmet (also known
as the hypo helmet), an impregnated
bag that covered the entire head, and
featured transparent mica or acetoid
eye pieces. By August, every man in
the division should have received a
cotton respirator and a smoke helmet,
while certain specialist troops in the
division, such as machine gun crews,
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Beginning in February 1916,
P helmets were gradually replaced
by PH (phenate-hexamine) helmets,
offering improved protection against
phosgene. It appears that artillerymen
were among the first soldiers to
receive PH helmets in Canadian
service, followed by a general issue
to all trades and ranks that spring.
As the PH helmet was entering
general service, an entirely novel
pattern of anti-gas respirator, the
large-box type (LBR), was introduced
to British forces. Like the tube helmets,
the LBRs were at first provided
only to specialist personnel such as
gunners, trench mortar and machine
gun crews, and field ambulance
men, in part because the new
apparatus was considered too bulky
for already overburdened infantry
soldiers. However, by October 1916,
as Canadian forces went into action
on the Somme, the newer smallbox respirator (SBR) was issued on
a scale of one per man across the
Canadian Corps, reflecting a similar
trend in the British forces. Each man

CWM20020045-288_p168

were equipped with an even newer
style of respirator known as the tube
helmet. The tube helmet differed
from the earlier smoke helmet in that
it was fitted with a valve tube through
which the soldier could exhale – a
feature that helped eliminate carbon
dioxide build-up inside the hood.
(When inhaling, a soldier’s breath
was filtered through the fabric of the
hood itself, which was chemically
treated in the same manner as earlier
types.) Improved tube helmets, which
were impregnated with an upgraded
solution that offered protection
against phosgene, were designated
as “P” (phenate) helmets.2 Canadian
soldiers were each supposed to
carry one smoke helmet and one
tube helmet as of October 1915. 3

Canon F.G. Scott, the highly
revered chaplain to 1st Canadian
Division, wears a small-box
respirator on the Western Front,
September 1917. Note how the
connecting tube leads to the
filter container carried within
the haversack on Scott’s
chest.
Canadian War Museum (CWM) 19780093-194

the trucks, were not fashioned out
of thin air. Rather, they were the
products of joint efforts across the
Dominion, coordinated at virtually
the last minute to manufacture
serviceable equipment on a grand
scale.
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Canadian War Museum (CWM) 19780093-194

An NCO checks the fit of small-box respirators
during anti-gas training somewhere on the
Western Front.

also continued to carry a PH helmet
and one pair of anti-gas goggles as
precautionary measures.
The face piece of the SBR was
made of a rubberized canvas material
similar to the type used in some
German masks. In contrast with
German models, which featured
a directly mounted charcoal filter
canister, the box respirator face piece
was connected to a corrugated tube,
which in turn mated up with the
filter element – known at the time as
a “tower” and later as a “container.”
The tower was supported inside the
khaki canvas respirator haversack,
which was carried on the soldier’s
chest. While the German pattern
of mask was more compact, British
authorities considered the box
respirator to be a superior design. The
weight of the filter was supported by
the haversack, and thus did not pull
the face piece away from the soldier’s
forehead and cheeks. This problem
with the German design allowed
traces of gas to seep in behind the
face piece. There is some evidence
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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that German soldiers, not realizing
that the seal between face piece and
skin had been broken, assumed
incorrectly that the filter itself was
chemically inefficient, thereby
losing confidence in their masks.
Interestingly, cultural determinism
crept into British intelligence
estimates, which suggested that
“the British soldier, being more of
an individualist [than the German],
can better understand the seclusion
imposed by wearing a mask,” and
was thus a more effective operator
in a chemical warfare environment.4
This dubious theory was probably
never tested.
Much of the credit for the
British development of the box-type
respirator went to the soldier-scientist
E.F. Harrison. An accomplished
pharmaceutical research chemist
in civil life, Harrison joined the
Sportsmen’s Battalion as an unlikely
47-year-old private in 1915.5 After the
German chlorine attack against the
Ypres salient that April, he transferred
to the Royal Engineers, where his

peacetime skills could be applied
to more productive ends. Harrison
quickly distinguished himself as
an inventor of anti-gas equipment,
and was promoted to the rank of
lieutenant-colonel in 1917. He later
became the controller of chemical
warfare, a post which ultimately cost
him his life. One week before the
war ended, Harrison succumbed to
pneumonia aggravated by repeated
exposure to a deadly mélange of
chemicals during his respirator
experiments. In 1921 a monument
was unveiled in his honour in the
Hall of the Pharmaceutical Society,
at Bloomsbury Square. Newspaper
reports lauded Harrison as man
whose invention “saved the British
Army.”6
Although specific materials
and construction were improved
considerably, the basic scheme of the
box respirator remained unchanged
in British Empire and Commonwealth
forces until the middle years of the
Second World War. Indeed, Major
John Ambrose Sadd, Harrison’s co53
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6(1)
70457_01
CWM 196

inventor of the original box respirator
in 1916, claimed patent rights for
the Mark IV series employed during
the 1930s and 1940s.7 Like the SBR,
the Mark IV comprised a face piece,
connecting tube, and container.
The face piece was fashioned of
molded vulcanized rubber with
separate glass eye piece discs. On
early models, both the face piece and
the corrugated rubber connecting
tube were covered in khaki stockinet
fabric. The purpose of the stockinet is
unclear, but it was later discontinued,
possibly for economic reasons, or
because, as a porous fabric, it was
difficult to decontaminate. The filter
container, of ribbed sheet metal,
incorporated a simple male fitting
which mated with the lower female
end of the connecting tube. Like the
SBR, the Mark IV respirator was
carried in a khaki haversack. When
not required, the haversack could be
slung over the shoulder. According to
tactical circumstances, the haversack
was to be worn on the chest in the
ready position. In
the event of a gas

54
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Designation

Key Features

Purpose

Mark IV, early issue

Made of red rubber, covered
with khaki stockinet; eye pieces
permanently installed

General issue

Mark IV, later issue

Made of black rubber, sometimes
with stockinet; eye pieces removable;
improved voice-mitter

General issue, priority given to
officers and NCOs because of
improved voice-mitter

Mark IV Special T

Similar to later issue Mark IV, but
For personnel wearing eye glasses
with modifications to the temples

Mark IV Special T Mic

As above, but fitted with the capped
For signals personnel
aperture for a microphone plug

Mark V

As above, without stoc kinet,
featuring molded cheek boss for For signals personnel and those
fitting microphone plug, suited for wearing eye glasses
personnel wearing eye glasses

Mark IVA and Mark VA

As with the Mark IV and V series, but For naval and air force technicians
fitted with longer connecting tubes and specialist personnel

Based on “Respirators, Anti-Gas,” App A, 5 March 1940, HQ 56-23 (vol 14), Vol 5921, RG 24.

alarm, the face piece was pulled from
the top of the haversack and fitted
to the soldier’s head. The container
rested in the bottom of the haversack,
as with the SBR.
In common with most other pieces
of military kit, the Mark IV respirator
was followed by several variants
and sub-variants (Table A). By way
of summary, the Mark IV Special
series incorporated an aperture on
the left cheek that was fitted with a
replaceable plastic
cap for fitting a
microphone.
Some versions
also
had
provision
for wearing
eye glasses
beneath the
face piece. 8
A later
variant, the
Mark V, was
introduced just
as the Second World
War broke out.9 In
place of a pre-fitted
aperture, the Mark
V incorporated a oneinch cylindrical boss on
the left cheek of the face
piece. If required, the boss
could be punched out and fitted
with a plug for a microphone. 10 A
second important difference between

the Mark IV and Mark V respirators
can be seen in their manufacture
techniques, at least within a Canadian
context. In Canada, the face piece
for the Mark IV was crafted in
hand molds, while the Mark V face
piece was made in machine press
molds. Different types of rubber
were employed in each case. Shortly
after the outbreak of war, it cost the
Canadian government about $7.65 for
each Mark IV respirator, including
the haversack and anti-dimming
compound for the eye pieces. A Mark
V cost about one dollar less.11
The Mark IV respirators and
subsequent variants were issued to
army, navy, and air force personnel,
with the exception that a longer
connecting tube was fitted to
naval and air force models. This
modification permitted the haversack
to be worn on the sailor or airman/
woman’s back when the respirator
was deployed, as it was not practical
for specialists and technicians to
carry the haversack on their chests
while working on machinery or in the
tight quarters of a ship or aircraft. In
February 1943, however, the number
of extended tubes issued to RCAF
personnel was reduced as a rubber
saving measure.12 It is uncertain if the
RCN similarly restricted the issue of
the longer connecting tubes.
Beginning in late 1942 or
early 1943 an improved respirator

W.E. Storey Collection

A Canadian Mk IV
respirator; the face piece
on this example was made
by Gutta Percha & Rubber
Limited, Toronto, in 1940.
Note that both the face piece and
the connecting tube are covered with
khaki stockinet.

Table A – Mark IV and V Respirator Variants
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T

he Canadian military neglected its
chemical warfare capabilities and
defensive measures during the 1920s,
despite the general belief that gas
would almost certainly be used in the
next major conflict.14 George Witten,
a newspaperman and South African
war veteran who narrowly survived
four years overseas during the Great
War, wrote in 1926 that gas was
not only the most humane weapon

A Canadian Mk IV Special T Mic
respirator; the face piece on this
exa m p l e wa s m a d e by
t h e B . F. G o o d r i c h
Company, Kitchener,
1941 . Note the
removable plastic cap
on the cheek for fitting
a microphone plug as
required.

6
19

Gas in the Interwar Years

available, but also the most
efficient. Witten himself
had been injured on four
occasions – by small
arms fire, shellfire,
mine detonation,
and gas. While
the gassing
incapacitated
him just as
fully as the
other injuries,
Witten claimed
that gassing was
far less painful,
and produced
fewer long-term
disabilities.
Without citing
any evidence,
he applied this
general conclusion
to many other gas
victims, claiming
further that gas was the
“most effective” weapon known. This
was questionable at best; although
heavily employed between 1915
and 1918 on the Western Front,
few battlefield victories were solely
attributable to gas. Yet if Witten
predicted incorrectly that gas was to
be crowned king of the battlefield,
his warning that troops must be
equipped and trained to deal with

M
CW

was introduced in British and
Commonwealth service, known
prosaically as the “respirator, antigas, light,” or more simply, the
light respirator. Although beyond
the scope of this article, the light
respirator employed a face piece
similar to the Mark IV series,
except that it dispensed entirely
with the connecting hose. Instead,
a cylindrical container not unlike
the German pattern was screwed
directly to the left cheek of the face
piece. The entire assembly was
carried in the rectangular Mark I
or II light haversacks.13 This model
is mentioned here because its
introduction influenced the issue
of Mark IV series respirators and
containers later in the war.

it was undoubtedly well
advised.15
Witten was partly vindicated
during the 1930s as chemical weapons
were in fact employed in limited wars
around the world, including the
Italian campaign in Ethiopia and the
Japanese war against China. These
cases of gas warfare, combined with
the increasing long-range capabilities
of heavy bombers, spread fears
that civilians would be targeted in
massive chemical offensives from the
air. Horrifying, if also hypothetical,
reports on the destructive capacity of
gas fed the hysteria. As an American
military chemist noted in 1937, the
matter of chemical warfare “has
been the happy hunting ground for
sensational newspaper and magazine
Sailors wearing respirator haversacks
line up for a refill. As naval personnel,
these men have probably been issued
Mark IVA or VA respirators, which
featured a longer connecting tube than
the standard Mark IV or V. This feature
permitted the haversack to be carried in
knapsack-fashion while the sailor was
wearing his mask in the close confines
of a ship. The air force also used this
type in large numbers.

55
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Making Respirators in
Canada

C

anadian authorities did not
wait for the outbreak of another
global war to take action on the
gas front. Although the Dominion
government was not yet prepared
to commit substantial resources to
defence research and development in
the midst of a crippling depression,
the potential for conflict was enough
for policy-makers to explore Canada’s
ability to manufacture it own military
equipment. 18 In June 1932, Major
G.P. Morrison, an artillery officer
posted to Petawawa Camp, made an
exploratory visit to the Safety Supply
Company, a Toronto wholesaler
and manufacturer of mining and
industrial safety equipment. The
company’s manager, R.C. Fuller,
had taken an interest in the
manufacture of anti-gas respirators
for industrial applications, but his
company had not yet developed
any prototype for military use. Part
of the problem was that Canadian
rubber companies possessed neither
the tooling for molding masks, nor
the mixing recipe and vulcanizing
technique for producing servicegrade rubber; such trade secrets
were closely guarded by the wellestablished British manufacturers
of respirator components.19 Indeed,
British companies such as Siebe
Gorman, a well known maker of
56
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Private Arnold Todd, of the Algonquin
Regiment, models his Mark IV respirator
at Port Arthur, Ontario, February 1941.
Todd, who survived the Northwest
Europe campaign of 1944-45, had this
photograph taken so that his family
could see his appearance in fighting
equipment and respirator. Note that
the Mark IV respirator is worn in the
same fashion as the earlier small-box
respirator.

diving equipment, had been selling
military style respirators on the
international market since 1918, a
practice that was encouraged by His
Majesty’s government in order to
keep the industry viable in the event
of a national emergency. In 1936,
the Bata Company, then based in
Czechoslovakia, purchased licensing
rights from the British for the Mark
IV-style respirator. (Like Canada, the
Czech government was tooling up for
a possible war with Germany.) Fatra,
a Bata subsidiary, manufactured
complete masks based on the British
pattern. According to a 1942 Bata
report, Fatra achieved an almost
unbelievable production capacity
of 25,000 masks per day before the
war. Many Fatra respirators were
even sold back to the British.20 While
Canada could also import respirators
to fill immediate requirements
for the mid 1930s, officials at the
Department of National Defence
(DND) ultimately wanted to develop
a domestic manufacturing capacity
not unlike the Bata/Fatra model in
Czechoslovkia.21
To assist Fuller in his efforts to
develop a manufacturing scheme
for the standard Mk IV respirator,
Morrison arranged to loan him the
molds for the respirator valve and
face piece. It would be up to the
Safety Supply Company to determine
the rubber recipe and vulcanization
process. Progress was slow, as Fuller
experienced difficulty finding a plant
capable of replicating and molding
the correct grade of rubber. Fuller
finally reached an agreement with the
Stokes Rubber Company of Welland,
Ontario, but Stokes had little to show
for its efforts in January 1933 when
Morrison again touched base with
him. As Fuller explained, Stokes
felt that the molding process should
more fully incorporate machine press
molds, in place of hand molding.22
Morrison countered that a complete
set of press molds would be too
expensive to create, and that they
would do a poor job of shaping

CWM 19920141-014

CWM 20070156-014

writers whose imaginations have
furnished lurid pictures of whole
populations being wiped out at a
single blow with poison gas dropped
from airplanes.”16 Some gas experts
– and others who claimed to be –
insisted that while gas would be
used in future wars, its potential
impact was very much exaggerated
in most accounts.17 Yet even if gas
was not to be a decisive weapon or
an instrument of Armageddon, any
army not prepared to confront it was
sure to suffer.
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the complex features of the face
piece. In either case, upon visiting
Stokes’s Welland plant in February,
Morrison deemed the facility entirely
unsuited for large scale face piece
manufacturing.23
Another year passed before
Safety Supply once again explored
the matter of face piece manufacture,
this time in conjunction with the B.F.
Goodrich Company of Kitchener,
Ontario. In addition to the face piece,
Morrison now also expressed an
interest in making the corrugated
rubber connecting tube that joined
the face piece to the container (filter
element or canister). But again, since
no hose molds existed in Canada,
it was left up to the manufacturer
to come up with a procedure that
would meet specifications.24 As far
as the face pieces were concerned,

Fuller reported in May 1934 that a
couple of examples had finally been
completed by Goodrich, and were to
be submitted to DND for inspection.25
In the meantime, impatient
military officials had contacted
the chief inspector of arms and
ammunition (CIAA) at Dominion
Arsenals in Quebec to determine if the
Mark IV respirator face pieces could
be manufactured in the DA workshops
by government employees.26 Given
that Fuller had managed to deliver
the Goodrich face pieces at the
eleventh hour, Lieutenant-Colonel
N.O. Carr (then serving as GSO I
artillery), intervened, suggesting
that individual components of the
Mark IV respirator, such as the
face pieces, should be produced by
private companies, only to undergo
final assembly at Dominion Arsenals.

Such an arrangement would not only
distribute the economic fruits of
government contracts more broadly
around the country, but by virtue
of geographic dispersal, would also
protect war production capacity
against the threat of sabotage or
enemy attacks. It would also free
plant capacity in government facilities
such as Dominion Arsenals. For the
moment, however, manufacturing
experiments would be limited to the
respirators and connecting tubes.
Due to some complexities in the
container construction, these would
have to wait until a later date for
exploration.27
The prototype masks from
Goodrich were by no means free of
defects, but they were good enough to
warrant continued cooperation from
DND. To this end, Morrison provided

CWM 19920141-014

Five members of the Women’s Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRENS) sport what appear to be Mark IVA Special T Mic respirators.
This variant of the Mark IV featured a capped aperture for fitting a microphone to the left cheek, as well as a lengthened
connected tube, so that the mask could be worn with the haversack carried at the lower side or on the back. Such respirators
were issued mainly to naval or air force personnel. Note that the women have stencilled their names on the haversack straps.
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research and development. MajorGeneral A.G.L. McNaughton, in
the post of chief of the general staff
(CGS), agreed with Pearkes. The draft
budget estimates for 1935-36 included
$15,000 for the domestic manufacture
of respirators. Ultimately, $10,000 was
approved for that fiscal year.31
The new funding stimulated
development work at Goodrich in
Kitchener, and also attracted the
interest of Gutta Percha & Rubber
Limited, a Toronto-based company.
(Safety Supply seems by then to
have fallen by the wayside as a
redundant middleman.) A technical
representative from Gutta Percha
was confident that his outfit would be
able to meet the rubber specifications;
he even suggested that recently
developed synthetic materials might
be used. 32 Government inspection
visits to the Goodrich and Gutta
Percha plants revealed each to
be excellently equipped with the
necessary machinery and laboratory
equipment. At present, these
facilities were dedicated largely to
the production of rubber footwear,
but there was no technical reason
why they could not switch over to
respirators, once the details of the
rubber compounds and molding
techniques were worked out.33
Goodrich and Gutta Percha
continued with limited experiments
throughout the winter of 1935, but
failed to achieve satisfactory results.
Neither company, according to a key
April 1936 defence memorandum,
had quite mastered the molding
or vulcanizing techniques. Major
Morrison, the artillery officer who
had originally visited the Safety
Supply Company four years earlier,
recognized that unless the government
offered the companies a true incentive
to invest more research time and
effort in the respirator problem, it
was unlikely that a solution could be
found in the near future. Accordingly,
Morrison suggested that the director
of contracts approach both companies
with pricing requests for masks by

batches of 100 and 1,000 pieces. At
the same time, detailed arrangements
for final assembly operations at
Dominion Arsenals should be made
with the CIAA.34
It is unclear if the director of
contracts did in fact immediately
approach the companies with
pricing requests, but Morrison’s
recommendation vis-à-vis Dominion
Arsenals was indeed pursued
throughout the summer of 1936.
As late as August, however, the
superintendant of Dominion Arsenals
reported that smaller components
and hardware required to complete
the face piece assembly (outlet valves,
head harness components, eye pieces,
and the corrugated connecting tube)
could not be procured from any local
companies. 35 Military authorities
would have to cast a wider net
across the country to secure all of
the parts necessary for final assembly
at the Dominion Arsenals plant.
Within a couple of months, Colonel
Carr, now director of mechanization
and artillery (DMA), reported that
sources and price quotes for all of
the necessary face piece components
had been secured. All together,
at least eight different companies
were required to supply everything
required. It only remained for General
McNaughton (now president of
the National Research Council) to
approve the rubber samples used in
face pieces and outlet valves.36 Testing
in this respect continued throughout
the winter of 1936-37. In January
1937, initial limited orders for most
of the essential components had been
placed (excepting filter containers,
which remained to be developed).
Major-General Clyde Caldwell, the
master-general of ordnance (MGO),
anticipated that 1,000 masks would
be completed within four months.
The War Office had promised to send
along specifications for the containers
so that these could also be sourced in
Canada, but in the meantime, 3,550
pieces were ordered from Britain.37
With the threat of war on the horizon,

University of Waterloo Library. Record Photo 1944_135

the Kitchener office with additional
specifications pertaining to the face
piece, connecting tube, as well as the
khaki stockinet material that was
used to cover both components. The
complexity of the manufacturing
process is evident in the fact that
about 100 engineering drawings
were necessary to illustrate all of the
components for the face piece and
hose. Further development work
at Goodrich was delayed when
Safety Supply misplaced some of
these drawings.28 Canadian military
officials had little choice but to
remain polite, since Safety Supply
and Goodrich were undertaking
the development work at their own
expense. Without any government
funding, there was minimal incentive
for the companies to hurry along their
efforts to develop a product for which
there was, as of yet, no certain mass
demand.
In face of limited Canadian
m a n u f a c t u r i n g c a p a c i t y, t h e
government had two short term
options. The first was to purchase
masks from the British, as had been
the usual practice since the Great
War. The second was to make funding
available for serious research and
development in Canadian industry.29
Lieutenant-Colonel George Pearkes,
then serving as a general staff officer
for the director of military training
and staff duties, estimated in 1934 that
if somewhere between $10,000 and
$15,000 worth funding was provided
during 1935-36, “the production of a
Canadian respirator, less container,
will be an accomplished fact.”30 The
catch was that the Canadian army
needed new masks immediately.
At the time there were only 1,449
serviceable masks in the country,
far too few to equip the Permanent
Force, let alone provide for anti-gas
training in the Militia. Although
somewhere between 700 and 2,500
new masks were needed in the short
run to make up for shortfalls, Pearkes
recommended that purchases be
delayed if it meant saving funds for

8

1/26/2010 10:23:25 AM

University of Waterloo Library. Record Photo 1944_135

University of Waterloo Library. Record Photo 1942_61

: “A Unique Art” Canadian Anti-Gas Respirator Production in the Second World War

Above: J.L. Ilsley, minister of finance, visits the B.F. Goodrich
Company in Kitchener, Ontario in April 1944.
Right: Employees at the B.F. Goodrich plant put nails into
Hitler’s coffin for this 1942 publicity photograph.

efforts to procure mass quantities
of materiel now accelerated. Of
the $96,500 allocated for anti-gas
equipment during the 1937-38 fiscal
year, Colonel Carr recommended that
$52,500 be applied to the purchase of
25,000 containers from the War Office
and $44,000 to buy 6,000 complete
face pieces, including their canvas
haversacks, from Canadian sources.38
Just three years short of war,
Canada approached self-sufficiency
in basic anti-gas equipment. There
were still, however, many wrinkles
to iron out at all stages in the supply
chain, including rubber finishing
and container development. As of
early 1937, Goodrich remained the
only Canadian company capable
of manufacturing serviceable face
pieces; Gutta Percha, the Torontobased rubber company, was still
working to make the grade.39 Yet even
the Goodrich face pieces were not
perfect. In February 1937, an early
sampling of 340 face pieces from the
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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Kitchener plant was inspected. Only
125 of these passed. Flaws included
defective eye sockets, porosity,
and uneven rubber thickness. 40
Minor flaws continued to surface
throughout 1937, although some of
these related to smaller components
and hardware items rather than the
face piece itself.41 In particular, the
domestic glass industry experienced
some difficulty manufacturing eye
pieces of sufficient quality to meet
government specifications.42
Te c h n i c a l p r o b l e m s ,
unfortunately, were not the only
barriers to a viable domestic
manufacturing program in 1937.
That June, the government stalled on
approval for a relatively large order of
11,000 masks demanded by the CGS
for the 1937-38 fiscal year. As DMA,
Colonel Carr warned in a scathing
memorandum that any further delays
in the program would “seriously
embarrass all concerned, and will
almost certainly result in failure to

secure the required quantities this
year.”43 Carr underscored the quality
control issues that slowed even the
completion of small batch orders for
1,000 masks. If domestic industry
was to meet the rigorous inspection
standards that were required for
anti-gas equipment, it must have
the opportunity to fill larger volume
orders sooner rather than later. As
Carr further explained:
Respirator production is, in
many respects, a unique art. The
preservation of the art against the
day when large quantities might
be required at short notice is a
problem which should receive every
consideration… If production ceases,
as is presently the case, there is great
risk of losing those skilled operators
already trained.44

In other words, if Canadian
companies did not exercise their
present capabilities to manufacture
59
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A Canadian Mark V respirator; the facepiece on this example was made by the B.F. Goodrich Company, Kitchener, 1941. Note the
molded boss on the cheek for fitting a microphone plug as required. The khaki stockinet normally used in earlier production has been
eliminated entirely from the manufacture of the face piece and connecting tube in this case.

t h e
precision
components required for respirators,
their employees would lose the hard
won skills developed over long
months of trial and error. When the
matter was brought to the attention
of the deputy minister of defence,
Léo La Flèche, he recommended that
enough respirators be ordered to fill
immediate current manufacturing
capacity.45 Now that Gutta Percha was
capable of turning out serviceable
face pieces, it seemed possible that
Canadian industry might complete
a maximum of between 10,000 and
12,500 masks by the end of fiscal;
given the limited scale of testing
facilities available, the lower figure
was more realistic. Yet just when it
appeared that production was really
about to get underway, the estimated
$32,000 required to complete the order
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was withdrawn. Mass production
would have to wait until 1938.46
To a degree, the provision of
funding was a moot point until
Major Morrison (working on behalf
of the DMA), and the CIAA secured
adequate shop space – at least 3,000
square feet – for the final assembly
and inspection of the respirators by
government employees.
It was first planned
to set up shop in
the Dominion
Arsenals
buildings
at Cove
F i e l d s ,
Q u e b e c .
These premises
were presently
occupied by
ammunition filling
operations, but would
be vacated sometime
over the next year. The next
best temporary option was to rent
space somewhere in Quebec City.
A number of sites were considered,

including a Ste. Anne Street building
formerly occupied by L’Action
catholique newspaper.47 Ultimately,
none of these proved satisfactory,
either because the buildings were
not sufficiently modern, or the rent
was deemed too high. Finally, in May
1938, the director of equipment and
ordnance services (DEOS) secured
authority to lease 3,800 square feet
on the fourth floor of a Rue Varennes
building.48 Much of the assembly and
inspection work of finished product
was to be carried out by young
female employees. At the outset of
production, it was estimated that
the assembly and inspection of 1,000
respirators would require “700 girl
hours.”49
With Hitler ’s grip already
tightening on Germany’s neighbours,
Canada’s respirator production
program was only just kicking
into gear. Immediate respirator
requirements for 1938-39 were
pegged at 11,000 for the Militia, 600
for the Royal Canadian Navy, and
4,505 for the Royal Canadian Air

Table B – Canadian Respirator Component Manufacturers
Manufacturer

Components Supplied

Coulter Copper & Brass Company, Toronto

eye piece retaining rings, valve guards, fasteners

Gutta Percha & Rubber Company, Toronto

face pieces, eye piece washers

Dominion Steel & Coal Corp., Montreal

binding wire

St. Lawrence Steel & Wire Co., Gananoque

harness buckles and loops

B.F. Goodrich Rubber Company, Kitchener

face pieces, connecting tubes, outlet valves, harness
pads

Canadian Die Casters, Galt

valve holders

W.E. Phillips Company, Oshawa

eye piece discs

Penmans Limited, Montreal

khaki stockinette

Dominion Rubber Company, Montreal

eye piece washers, rubber tape

Woods Manufacturing Co. Limited, Welland haversacks
Belding Corticelli, Montreal

elastic harness webbing

Russell Manufacturing Company

elastic harness webbing

Duplate Safety Glass Co. of Canada, Oshawa

eye piece discs

Aluminum Company of Canada, Montreal

valve holders

Byers Company Limited, Toronto

harness buckles and loops
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for all three services. 58 Changing
circumstances soon dictated that
this quantity be increased by a
considerable margin.

Containers

T

he last remaining obstacle to
Canadian self-sufficiency was
the Type E container which served
as the filter for the Mark IV system.
It appears that Canadians did not
embark upon detailed investigation of
the domestic manufacture of the Type
E-series containers until 1938‑39.59

on

program. The paper’s editor believed,
mistakenly, that the respirators were
being manufactured somewhere in
Toronto, and he wanted details and
photographs. Gutta Percha’s general
manager, F.A. Warren, evaded
repeated information requests, before
writing to La Flèche in desperation.
Perhaps, Warren suggested, it
would be better to issue a guarded
statement to the press rather than
fend off repeated inquiries.56 Ottawa
relented, and Colonel Carr drew up
a release the next day. In essence,
it underscored the challenges of
coordinating Canadian industry to
meet the precision manufacturing
requirements for respirators. Carr
also noted that the Canadian Mark
IV measured up well against the
British version (which had already
been in production for many years),
for approximately the same cost. 57
With the production program well
underway by early 1939, requirements
for the 1939-40 fiscal year were
projected at 11,600 respirators

W.E. Storey collecti

Force. 50 By mid-1938, production
finally began to move forward, with
more than a dozen outfits providing
components for the finished product
(Table B).51 Notably, the British War
Office had by then taken a favourable
view of the Canadian-manufactured
face pieces.52
Throughout 1938-39, the number
of contractors involved with respirator
production increased, while some
existing contractors began work on
additional items. For example, when
it was anticipated that new machine
press moulds were to arrive from
Britain for the manufacture of the
Mark V respirator, DND officials
planned to let contracts for face pieces
to the Dominion Rubber Company.53
As well, several other companies
won contracts for accessories such
as the haversacks; these included:
S.S. Holden Limited (Ottawa) and
J.E. Lortie (Montreal). Ultimately,
project officers at DND preferred that
more rather than fewer companies be
involved in production. As Colonel
Carr noted in April 1939, contracts
should be “spread over as many firms
as practicable in order to obtain as
many potential sources of supply as
possible in the event of an emergency
programme having to be put into
operation.”54
Given the contemporary
sensational media reporting on gas
warfare, it is not surprising that
the press began to take a special
interest in Canadian preparations.
When The Toronto Star Weekly
first requested photographs of the
Canadian respirators and production
facilities in late 1937, the paper
was put off by defence officials.
This had less to do with secrecy
than the fact that no production
facilities yet existed; any report on
Canada’s homegrown respirator
industry would have been entirely
underwhelming. 55 Undeterred,
the Star Weekly approached Gutta
Percha, one of the Toronto-based
manufacturers involved with the

An illustration from a 1939 training
manual shows the new Mark V respirator
with its haversack.
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Compared
with the face
p i e c e d e ve l o p m e n t , h o we ve r,
the containers were relatively
straightforward, given that there
were only four principal components
r e q u i r e d : t h e c a n i s t e r, f i l l i n g
materials, compression springs, and
inlet valve. On the eve of war, three of
these four components were already
being manufactured in Canada.
Ontario Metal Specialties (Bronte,
Ontario) was the first company
to produce the canister, although
General Steel Wares later produced
very large quantities. Steele Brothers
(Guelph) turned out the springs,
while Seiberling Rubber Company
(Toronto) handled the inlet valves.
The filling materials, which were
responsible for neutralizing any war
gases inhaled through the container,
were still imported from Britain at
this time, at least in part because the
formula was a strictly guarded War
Office secret. The containers were
assembled and filled at the National
Research Council Annex, at the
corner of Sussex and John Streets
in Ottawa, apparently due to space
limitations at the respirator assembly
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A Type E “green dot” container
designed to offer improved protection
against cyanogen chloride and
hydrogen cyanide. The dime-sized
green dot is clearly visible on the
top right side, partly over top of the
“GSW” stamping. GSW stands for
General Steel Wares, a Canadian
company that manufactured
a variety of metal products
for Canada’s military forces,
especially ammunition boxes,
steel helmets, and canisters
for respirator containers. This
particular canister was made
at GSW’s MacDonald Plant in
Toronto.

shop in Quebec.60 (See Table C
for details on containers.)
Late in the war, chemical
warfare experts determined that
the conventional Type E filter
did not afford sufficient protection
against certain agents. One of these,
cyanogen chloride (known as CK or
CNCl) was an especially toxic blood
agent. Another was prussic acid (AC
or HCN), more properly known as
hydrogen cyanide, and now infamous
for its widespread use in Nazi death
camps. Although Allied intelligence
reports doubted that the Germans
were apt to use CK “in any wholesale
manner in the immediate future,”
chemical warfare experts felt that
RAF and RCAF personnel who, after
1943, were still equipped with the
Mark IV and V series respirators (as
opposed to the new light respirator)
might need extra protection.61 One
option was to treat ordinary Type
E containers with a solvent called
pyridine. Another option was to
retrofit Mark IV and V respirators
with the Type E “green dot” high
performance container, a new variant
that offered better protection than the
old Type E, and so called because a

small green dot was painted on the
top of the container. 62 Late in the
war, Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Flood,
the superintendent of Canada’s
Chemical Warfare Laboratories,
doubted that the current threat was
severe enough to warrant wholesale
pyridine treatment. Given that the
70,000 green dot containers held in
reserve for the Canadian Army were
no longer required (because of the
general issue of the light respirator
to the Canadian Army Overseas after
1943), these were made available to
the RCAF. Meanwhile, the Canadian
Army retained a reserve of 100,000
Mark II green dot containers for the
light respirator.63

Conclusion

O

n the eve of war Canada’s
domestic manufacturing
capacity was firmly grounded in
the chemical warfare sector. The
Canadian government felt secure
enough with this knowledge to
refuse offers to purchase Britishmade respirators in the dark summer
of 1939.64 On the contrary, Canada
would soon be in a position to
export chemical warfare equipment
to friendly countries, some of which
had already made enquiries.65 By the
summer of 1940, Colonel Morrison,
still working for the DMA, was
striving for an output rate of 6,000
respirators per week. To help meet
this demand, companies like B.F.
Goodrich were turning out face
pieces 24 hours a day.66 By early 1941,
Canada had produced in excess of
250,000 respirators (excluding naval
and air force contracts), and was now
in a position to export surplus output
to allies.67 Taking the Type E container

Table C – Container Variants
Type

Colour

Purpose

Type A

dull blue

Type E Marks I, II, II, IV

brown / red oxide

For operational use in Canada only

brown / red oxide

For operational use overseas, included an
improved inlet valve

Type E Mark V

For training only
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as an example, Canada had turned
out more than 600,000 pieces by the
end of 1941, of which 175,000 were
supplied to South African troops and
nearly 60,000 to New Zealanders.68
This great production capacity was
the glad consequence of several years
of challenging developmental work
undertaken by Canadian industries
and a small group of army officers.
Besides respirators, there were many
other items in Canadian service
that followed similarly complex
development paths from the drawing
board to the shop floor to the soldier’s
kit.
At the outset of the Second World
War, Allied intelligence estimates
suggested that if German forces
did resort to gas, they were likely
to employ tactics similar to those of
the 1918 spring counteroffensives.
This meant that persistent agents,
such as Yellow Cross, would be
used to neutralize strong points,
create physical barriers, or simply
immobilize basic defences. As the
British braced for what seemed a
likely German invasion of the home
islands in 1940, it was anticipated
that aircraft would serve as the
primary mode of delivery.69 British
assumptions regarding the potential
tactical employment of gas by German
forces were essentially rational, given
the information available at the time
and the experience of the First World
War. What if there had been such an
attack? Speaking to the Canadian
Institute of Chemistry at Hamilton,
Ontario in June 1942, LieutenantColonel Flood, the superintendent
of Canada’s Chemical Warfare
Laboratories, noted that well trained
soldiers equipped with anti-gas
respirators and protective clothing
would be more or less invulnerable to
gas tactics. Indeed, it would probably
be easier to prevent casualties by gas
than by shot or shell.70
At the time of Flood’s speech
before the Institute of Chemistry,
Canadian soldiers were indeed well
kitted out with anti-gas respirators
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009
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and other protective equipment,
but it had been a close call. As late
as Christmas 1939, it appears that
there were not enough respirators to
go around to all Canadian soldiers
stationed in Britain.71 As with other
war supplies, this state of affairs
gradually changed for the better
over the next year. Canada not only
produced enough equipment for
its own forces, but was also able to
supply other Allied nations with antigas components. This manufacturing
program represented only one
small component of Canada’s larger
military output. It also underscored
the reality, all too often overlooked
in macro-level study of military
logistics and the Second World War
Materialschlacht, that the ability to
produce sophisticated equipment
does not simply exist in nature, but
more often than not, is the result
of years of frustrating trial, error,
negotiation, and false starts.
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